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ABSTRACT 
Advances in biology, at least over the past two centuries, have mostly relied on theories that were subsequently 
revised, expanded or eventually refuted using experimental and other means. The field of theoretical biology 
used to primarily provide a basis, similar to theoretical physics in the physical sciences, to rationally examine the 
frameworks within which biological experiments were carried out and to shed light on overlooked gaps in 
understanding. Today, however, theoretical biology has generally become synonymous with computational and 
mathematical biology. This could in part be explained by a relatively recent tendency in which a “data first”, 
rather than a “theory first”, approach is preferred. Moreover, generating hypotheses has at times become 
procedural rather than theoretical, therefore perhaps inadvertently leading some hypotheses to become 
perfunctory in nature. This situation leaves our understanding enmeshed in data, which should be disentangled 
from much noise. Given the many unresolved questions in biology and medicine, big and small, ranging from the 
problem of protein folding to unifying causative frameworks of complex non-Mendelian human diseases, it 
seems apt to revive the role of pure theory in the biological sciences. This paper, using the current biomedical 
literature and historical precedents, makes the case for a “philosophical biology” (philbiology), distinct from but 
quite complementary to philosophy of biology (philobiology), which would entail biological investigation through 
philosophical approaches. Philbiology would thus be a reincarnation of theoretical biology, adopting the true 
sense of the word “theory” and making use of a rich tradition of serious philosophical approaches in the natural 
sciences. A philbiological investigation, after clearly defining a given biological problem, would aim to propose a 
set of empirical questions, along with a class of possible solutions, about that problem. Importantly, whether or 
not the questions can be tested using current experimental paradigms would be secondary to whether the 
questions are inherently empirical or not. These issues will be illustrated using a range of specific examples. The 
final goal of a philbiological investigation would be to develop a theoretical framework that can lead 
observational and/or interventional experimental studies of the defined problem, a framework that is structured, 
generative and expandable, and, crucially, one that simplifies some aspect(s) of the said problem. 
 
 
 
MAIN TEXT 
Biology, particularly molecular biology, has experienced significant changes and technical innovations in the past 
several decades. Whereas novel insights and descriptive modes of understanding began to emerge from the 
early applications of molecular biology in the 1970s and 1980s, the widespread popularity of high-throughput 
techniques and genome sequencing in the 1990s and 2000s led to the generation of a tremendous amount of 
new insights and descriptive data about the workings of the cell under normal and disease conditions [1]. The 
human impact of these findings has been especially pronounced in the case of monogenic and/or relatively rare 
Mendelian diseases. Moreover, among human cancers, one can point to successful primary treatments of 
lymphomas/leukemias (see for example refs. [2,3,4]) and to overall “annual reductions of 1 to 2% in age-
adjusted cancer mortality rates in the United States for many years” [5]. In the domain of infectious diseases, the 
recently rising cure rates in hepatitis C cases are especially noteworthy [6]. However, contrary to initial 
expectations, most common human diseases have remained refractory to various (non-symptomatic) therapeutic 
interventions, mostly because we have not been able to unify the diseases under common causative models 
and/or mechanisms. In fact, we may sometimes observe in molecular biology research that finding a new 
“mechanism” in a cellular process comes to only mean finding “a molecule that is involved in the process” [7], 
which is clearly not in the true spirit of what a “mechanism” entails. Furthermore, although vaccines or 
immunotherapies are exceptionally effective when applied to preventing infections or treating a particular 
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neoplasm, one is in essence redirecting the means of a complex and still-to-be-understood component of a 
natural system (i.e., the immune system) to treat a disorder in another part of that same system, thereby 
circumventing a direct engagement with the system. Overall, it is evident that the mechanistic complexity and 
heterogeneity of common diseases have proven difficult to simplify [8,9]. Although there have been many 
suggestions to view each common disease merely as an umbrella term for different constituent smaller diseases, 
there nevertheless appears to be a common theme and collection of phenotypes that unite all manifestations of 
each common disease. The question, therefore, is: what is preventing us from reaching a real and unifying 
understanding of these pathologies? 
 
 One can posit that the most plausible answer to the question above is a lack of suitable explanatory and 
predictive theories in today’s biology. It is evident that theory has always been an indistinguishable part of the 
biological sciences, from ecology [10], evolutionary theory and microbiological basis of disease [11] to the 
elucidation of DNA and protein structures and networks of gene regulation [12,13]. Nevertheless, in the era of 
high-throughput and big-data experiments, a notion has become prevalent that observations and data collection 
can be pursued independently of prior theories. This cannot be the case, since no process of data collection, 
however carefully planned, can be completely devoid of bias [14]. In the words of Albert Einstein, “it is the theory 
that determines what we can observe,” a statement which was followed by Werner Heisenberg’s comment that 
“we have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself, but nature exposed to our method of 
questioning” [15]. A pertinent example here could be the utility of Alan Turing’s theoretical reaction-diffusion 
model to the recent observation of “Turing-like features in the periodic pattern of digits” in developing limb buds 
[16,17]. Presently, theoretical biology, with some exceptions, has become mostly synonymous with 
computational biology and the application of mathematical models to various forms of data structures (for some 
examples, see refs. [18,19,20,21,22,23,24]). The time is therefore ripe to reintroduce genuine theoretical 
analysis back into biology. But where would new theories come from? One source could be philosophy, in the 
form of philosophical biology (henceforth referred to as philbiology). As a side note, the phrase “philosophical 
biology”, or “philosophical science” in general, would have seemed pleonastic to the scientists of the 
Enlightenment and later periods, but today this pleonasm may be necessary. Philbiology, distinct from 
philosophy of biology (philobiology), could endeavor to search for, propose and develop questions and answers 
in the true spirit of the theoretical sciences using a vast array of tried-and-tested analytical philosophical tools 
that have been developed over many centuries. It has to be emphasized that the goal is not to produce theories 
only, because, in the words of the evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin, “there is no end to plausible 
storytelling” [25]. Rather, the theories should be accompanied by inherently-testable sets of questions and 
possible solutions. The aim of this paper is to suggest a framework whereby philosophical approaches can find 
their way back into mainstream biological research, in the form of a new philosophical biology. 
 
 
Current State of Philosophy in Biology 
The paramount goal of biology, as in the other natural sciences, has been to better understand facets of the 
natural world through simplification and generalizable “rules”. For example, the process of simplification has 
been evident in theoretical physics [26] or the field of biolinguistics over the past several decades. Robert C. 
Berwick and Noam Chomsky recently note that “complex linguistic rule systems are now a thing of the past; they 
have been replaced by much simpler, hence more evolutionarily plausible, approaches” [27]. Moreover, they 
emphasize that “without serious understanding of the fundamental nature of some system, its manifestations will 
appear to be chaotic, highly variable, and lacking general properties” [27]. Recently and in the past, however, not 
all goals in the natural sciences have been directed towards simplification per se. The nature of some questions 
has historically been more metaphysical. For example, a commentary appearing in the North American Review 
in 1868 stated that the “great questions of biology, considered in its philosophical aspect, are three: What is the 
origin of life in the first instance? What is the origin of species or the different forms of life? What are the causes 
of organic evolution in general?” [28]. 
 
Given that simplification is a form of knowledge, how has “knowledge” been described historically in the 
natural sciences and philosophy? In his magnum opus Ethics published in 1677, Baruch Spinoza draws a 
distinction among three types of knowledge: (i) “knowledge of the first kind” being opinion or imagination, (ii) 
“knowledge of the second kind” being reason, and (iii) intuition forming “knowledge of the third kind” [29]. 
Although the definitions and common usages of these terms may differ in various respects today compared to 
the seventeenth century, one can argue that although reason is generally held as the salient type of knowledge 
in biology and the natural sciences, all three types of knowledge nevertheless contribute to what we consider as 
our collective understanding of biology. Bertrand Russell differentiated between “knowledge by acquaintance” 
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and “knowledge by description” [30]. Looking at these from another angle, and using the philosophical notion of 
Verstehen that is used in the social sciences to study how one relates to that which one wants to understand, we 
can perhaps distinguish between two types of understanding: participatory and non-participatory. Let us 
begin with the latter type. Non-participatory (or intrinsic) understanding can, for example, refer to the type of 
understanding that the human mind can have of the primary colors. A person can “understand” and be 
“knowledgeable” of the colors perfectly and in a plethora of contexts, but cannot begin to truly explain, describe 
or convey that understanding. In this way, facets of the conscious mind are not “participating” in forming that 
understanding. Non-participatory understanding is thus devoid of explicit cause-and-effect features or forms of 
measurement, and the mantra of “through measuring to knowing” [31] cannot hold true. It is perhaps suitable to 
quote the philosopher and psychologist Wilhelm Dilthey who noted in 1894 that “we explain nature, [whereas] we 
understand psychic life” [32], drawing a distinction between explanation and understanding. 
 
Participatory (or external) understanding can be exemplified with understanding the mechanism of a 
clock, and the ability to explain and reconstruct it. We can actively and consciously “participate” in forming this 
type of knowledge. Participatory understanding is typical of the kind of understanding the natural sciences can 
initially aim for, which may not resonate with internal forms of understanding in the mind and would therefore 
have to be mechanistic and descriptive [33]. This is a main reason for the widespread use of metaphors in 
biology. In protein biology, for example, we talk of “folding”, “binding affinity” [34], “liquid-to-solid phase transition” 
[35] and “liquid droplets” [36], to name a few. Representations and diagrams, such as actograms in circadian 
rhythm research [37,38], are also essentially metaphorical. “Emergence” is another popular metaphor, 
particulately in the neuroscience field, which is unfortunately an intractable notion [39]. As an aside, emergent 
behavior in biology was modeled using partial differential equations beginning in the 1970s [40], and later used 
as a means to explain phenotypes of a genetic reductionist model. However, it may be fair to argue that this and 
similar notions have not aided in augmenting mechanistic understanding in biology. In fact, the concept of 
emergence can be traced back to condensed-matter physics and the still-present gap between the 
understanding of individual components (e.g., electrons) and resultant phenomena (e.g., a material’s electronic 
properties) [41]. Here, in the case of electrons and electronic properties, although the mantra of “the whole being 
more than [or other than] the sum of its parts” [42] rings true, serious investigations of the connections between 
the parts and the whole can begin only when it can be claimed with some certainty that all the parts are in fact 
known. 
 
 Metaphors are problematic because they borrow from components of our intrinsic understanding to aid 
in external understanding. Metaphors can certainly be helpful at first, but should eventually be replaced with a 
suitable explanatory theory. In other words, the aim in fields as diverse as protein folding or neuroscience should 
be to “define a technical notation in the context of an explanatory theory” [43]. In other words, “approximating 
observational phenomena is very different from formulating an explanatory account of a significant body of 
empirical data” [44]. If such explanatory theories are based on sound philosophical reasoning, the results could 
be fruitful. Lymphocytic V(D)J recombination in adaptive immunity [45] and the elucidation of friction reduction by 
bacteria in their medium [46,47,48] are two instances of the successful implementation of a strong theoretical 
model through to experimental validation. Another example of the usage of sound theoretical arguments in 
advance of establishing an experimental paradigm is the recent focus on siderophore quenching strategies to 
avoid the emergence of antibiotic resistance in a bacterial community [49], which in essence shift the burden of 
antibiotic resistance from individual bacterial cells or colonies to a microbial community. In fact, it appears that 
the immune system utilizes a similar strategy as part of its own defensive mechanisms [50]. 
 
 
An Abridged Selection of the History of Philosophy in Medicine and Biology 
Building on the few examples provided above, it may be useful to have a more in-depth look at some historical 
precedents of philosophical reasoning in what we now call the biomedical sciences. To begin with, in 1235 AD, 
Nasir ad-Din Tusi completed his wide-ranging magnum opus Akhlaq-i Nasiri (“The Nasirean Ethics”), in which, 
among other topics, he postulated one of the earliest known observation-based theories of speciation and 
adaptation. Furthermore, he categorized the different branches of philosophy, including the natural sciences, as 
follows (transl. G. M. Wickens, 1964): 
“Knowledge of existent things is […] in two divisions: that relating to the first division, called 
Speculative Philosophy; and that of the second division, called Practical Philosophy. 
Speculative Philosophy itself is in two divisions: a knowledge of that, the existence of which is 
not conditional on involvement with matter; and, secondly, a knowledge of that which cannot 
exist so long as there be no involvement with matter. This latter division is also twice divided: 
 
4 
 
on the one hand is that, into the intellection and conception of which consideration of 
involvement with matter does not enter as a condition; on the other, is that which is known 
only by consideration of involvement with matter. Thus, in this way, there are three divisions of 
Speculative Philosophy: the first is called Metaphysics, the second Mathematics, and the third 
Natural Science.” 
 
This early account acts as a suitable framework to consider later applications of philosophical 
approaches to understand, in the words of Tusi, the “existent things”. In the first volume of his 1689 “An Essay 
Concerning Humane Understanding”, John Locke offered an account of causality that still informs today’s use of 
mechanistic explanations in molecular biology: “For to have the idea of cause and effect, it suffices to consider 
any simple idea or substance, as beginning to exist, by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner 
of that operation.” Nevertheless, the tension between experimental and theoretical approaches in biology too 
has historical roots. One can, for example, point to differing modes of explanation in the seventeenth century of 
“spontaneous generation” in embryology [51], or the eighteenth century Scottish surgeon John Hunter’s 
suggestion to his vaccine-pioneering student Edward Jenner to “Don’t think. Try” [52,53]. In the 1850s, Rudolf 
Virchow, the pioneer of cellular pathology [54], is famous for having quoted Salomon Neumann that “medicine is 
a social science” [55]. He also stated that “medicine as a social science, as the science of human beings, has 
the obligation to point out problems and to attempt their theoretical solution; the politician, the practical 
anthropologist, must find the means for their actual solution” [56]. 
 
Here it may be worthwhile to point to some specific cases from the past two centuries where philosophy, 
theory and experimentation demonstrate an intertwined relationship. In 1806, Theodor Grotthuss proposed a 
theory of proton tunneling across hydrogen bonds [57]. The Grotthuss mechanism remains an enigmatic and 
very relevant question and phenomenon in studies of water structure and water-protein interactions. Theoretical 
investigations into hydrogen bonding in water remain an active area of research, as for example David C. Clary 
recently notes that “the excellent detailed agreement between the quantum dynamical calculations and 
experimental data shows that theory is getting much closer to a highly accurate description of water and, thus, to 
providing a detailed quantitative understanding of hydrogen-bond dynamics” [58]. In 1872, Casimir Davaine put 
forth the idea of “passages” in microbiology by studying Bacillus anthracis virulence in blood samples, a concept 
that has been a mainstay of any microbiological experiment up to this day. The duality of humoralism versus 
cellularism began to take shape in 1882, with the development of Ilya Metchnikoff’s theory of phagocytosis [59]. 
Although initially derided by some as a “fairy tale” [60], this theory still resonates today in immunological 
research on phagocytic cells and inflammation [61]. Around the same period, Louis Pasteur’s “discovery that 
microbes discriminate between D- and L-substrates […] had been given little attention until taken up by [Emil] 
Fischer, who suggested that ‘the yeast cells with their asymmetrically formed agent are capable of attacking only 
sugars of which the geometrical form does not differ too widely from that of D-glucose’” [62], leading to Fischer’s 
proposition of a “lock and key” metaphor in 1894. The interaction between theory and observation wasn’t always 
harmonious in hindsight. For example, Bacillus icteroides was proposed in 1896 (by Giuseppe Sanarelli) as a 
bacterial cause of yellow fever which fulfilled Koch’s postulates. Similarly, based on the prevalent germ theory of 
the early twentieth century, investigators’ finding of the bacterium Haemophilus influenzae in influenza patients 
was perfectly reasonable and a suitable answer for the cause of influenza. Only a few decades later was a virus 
identified as the cause through the work of Richard Shope and colleagues [63]. In fact, Oswald T. Avery’s work 
on DNA was a result of his decades-long work on influenza and pneumonia in the same period (for an in-depth 
discussion, see ref. [52]). 
 
The examples above show approaches that started with a philosophical theory followed by selective 
experimentation, leading eventually to a refined theory. Nevertheless, there were instances where this model did 
not apply. For example, in 1909, Paul Ehrlich and his collaborators tested nine hundred chemical compounds for 
a syphilis treatment to eventually identify Salvarsan, which we could venture to call one of the earliest precursors 
(since the heydays of alchemy) of today’s high-throughput compound screens. This approach relied more on 
trial-and-error than ab initio theorizing. One can also point to important biological questions for which theory and 
heuristics have played less pronounced roles individually, the results of which are still being explored today. For 
example, since the work of Frederick Banting, Charles Best and Nicolae Paulescu in the early 1920s on insulin 
extracts, we now have detailed descriptions of insulin signaling cascades using high-throughput 
phosphoproteomics [64]. Moreover, around 1945, Søren L. Ørskov’s biochemical studies of the diffusion of 
metabolites across the yeast cell membrane led him to compare and contrast a “pore theory” and a “lipid 
solubility theory” of the diffusion process [62,65]. The roles of protein channels and the phospholipid bilayer in 
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acting as an interface between the intracellular and extracellular environments are as relevant today as seven 
decades ago. 
 
The first half of the twentieth century saw the formalized emergence of theoretical and experimental 
branches in physics, a division that might not have seemed necessary beforehand. Biology saw similar 
developments. In the 1930s, after the work of investigators such as J. B. S. Haldane, Ronald Fisher and Sewall 
Wright had established modern synthesis in evolutionary biology, Conrad H. Waddington and Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, among others, proceeded towards formalizing “theoretical biology” and “systems biology”, 
respectively [66]. In 1968, Marjorie Grene published “Approaches to a Philosophical Biology” on the state and 
outlook of the philosophy of biology and, over the next several decades, elements of philosophical approaches 
to biology were further extended into medical humanities (e.g., in Hans Jonas’s 1966 publication on bioethics in 
“The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology”), philosophical psychology, philosophy of chemistry, 
philosophical chemistry (tracing its roots at least back to the work of Joseph Black in the eighteenth century), 
physical oncology [67], healthcare improvement theory [68] and other related disciplines. Nevertheless, with the 
advent of recombinant DNA technology in the 1970s followed by molecular biology and the widespread adoption 
of relevant technologies such as flow cytometry [69], theoretical/philosophical biology did not have an 
opportunity to reach the same level of attention as its counterpart in physics, and today, as noted earlier, many 
consider theoretical biology to be synonymous with computational and mathematical biology. This is not to say 
that questions pertaining to theoretical biology have been forgotten. Some of these questions have indeed been 
rigorously pursued under the domain of philosophy of science/biology, focusing on problems in evolutionary 
theory or population genetics, amongst others [70,71]. 
 
 
Philbiology: Theory and Practice 
Based on these historical precedents, the point of philosophical biology would be to renew the application of 
philosophical reasoning to theoretical biology research. As noted earlier, philbiology would be distinct from 
philosophy of biology, which is primarily a philosophical/historical approach to the development of the biological 
sciences up to the present (it should be noted here that historical analysis may or may not be included in 
philosophy of biology investigations in different circles). Philbiology is biology through philosophy, while 
philobiology (in its pure form) is, by definition, philosophy and history through biology. Philbiology aims to gain 
insights into foundational questions in biology using a philosophical approach. Its objectives would, in essence, 
be similar to the ideals of the physical sciences community in the early period of theoretical physics in the 1920s 
and 1930s. In fact, Max Born commented in 1963 that “I am now convinced that theoretical physics is actually 
philosophy”. Nevertheless, although the goals would be similar, it is evident that biology and physics are 
dissimilar in many ways and not necessarily reducible to each other. As Berwick and Chomsky point out, 
“biology is more like case law, not Newtonian physics” [27]. 
 
A primary concern of philbiology would be on the development of models in biology. Baruch Spinoza 
pointed out a common fallacy regarding models in his Ethics (1677): “For men are wont to form general ideas 
both of natural phenomena and of artifacts, and these ideas they regard as models, and they believe that Nature 
[…] looks to these ideas and holds them before herself as models. So when they see something occurring in 
Nature at variance with their preconceived ideal of the thing in question, they believe that Nature has then failed 
or blundered and has left that thing imperfect” [29]. In other words, testing a model against a natural 
phenomenon is different than testing the said natural phenomenon against the said model, an issue which is as 
relevant today as it was more than 300 years ago. Jeremy Gunawardena defines a model as “some form of 
symbolic representation of our assumptions about reality” [72], with “assumptions” here being a key word. He 
further describes the duality between informal models (mental, verbal, etc.) and formal models (mathematical) in 
biology. Whereas assumptions about reality are tested daily in the laboratory, and formal models are 
developed in computational/mathematical biology, informal models, as a bridge between our 
assumptions about reality and symbolic representations of those assumptions, are ripe for 
philosophical investigation [73]. A second primary concern of philbiology would be on studying the “limits” of 
our current understanding in biology. What is accessible to us today and what is inaccessible? What can we 
reasonably expect to find and understand about the cell, given that not finding something does not indicate its 
non-existence [74]? Again drawing on an analogy with theoretical physics, the following observation from the 
physicist Jean Baptiste Perrin in his 1926 Nobel Lecture [75] is pertinent: 
“Certain scholars considered that since the appearances on our scale were finally the only 
important ones for us, there was no point in seeking what might exist in an inaccessible 
domain. I find it very difficult to understand this point of view since what is inaccessible today 
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may become accessible tomorrow (as has happened by the invention of the microscope), and 
also because coherent assumptions on what is still invisible may increase our understanding 
of the visible.” [75] 
 
There is at present some biological research that could, on closer inspection, be categorized as falling 
under the philbiology category. The work of Mariscal and Doolittle on the origins of eukaryotes [76] or that of 
Wei, Prentice and Balasubramanian on using mathematical modeling to propose that a “principle of economy 
predicts the functional architecture of grid cells” [77], both in 2015, are two such studies. Nevertheless, it would 
be prudent here to suggest a few specific examples of questions and topics that a philosophical biologist could 
consider (Figure 1). These examples are divided into two categories: Theoretical Methods and Tools (TMT) and 
Theoretical Problems and Solutions (TPS): 
 
TMT 
When we mention “philosophical methods”, the logical operations of deduction and induction are usually 
invoked. To be specific, using the case of the cellular basis of time [78] as an example, we could say the 
following: (A) If (i) all biological reactions in cellular environments are synchronous and (ii) all synchronous 
phenomena need an internal or external pacemaker, then we can syllogistically deduce that (iii) all biological 
reactions in cellular environments are definitely driven by a pacemaker. (B) If (i) cell line A has a pacemaker and 
(ii) cell line B also has a pacemaker, then we can induce that (iii) other cells may also have a pacemaker. These 
two methods are very useful and are in fact indistinguishable components of human rational reasoning in 
general. Nevertheless, in proposing a set of methods and tools for philbiology, we could develop approaches 
that are more specific and tailored to the kinds of questions that are investigated. 
 
 The Theoretical Methods and Tools (TMT) category can encompass various utilizations and 
developments of philosophical (and related) approaches for applications to specific biological questions (see for 
example ref. [79]). These approaches could be analytical, following the works of philosophers such as Gottlob 
Frege, Alfred Tarski and W. V. Quine, or could follow non-analytical and non-traditional reasoning methods. If a 
philbiological investigation foresees a direct or an immediate human impact, the philosophical approach should 
be grounded in moral philosophy. As much as possible, one could aim to initially avoid using philosophical 
methods that provoke competing or non-trivial definitions (e.g., mereological, teleological, epistemological, 
tautological, phenomenological, ontological, normative, etc.) and to appeal to as-simple-as-possible rational and 
common-sense approaches. Nevertheless, certain “simplified” components of the concepts in the former 
category should necessarily be used. Some examples include: 
 
1. When we attempt to understand and describe the behavior of a protein or lipid membrane in a cell, how 
do we begin to offer a “good” explanation? Is a molecular “descriptive” account an “explanation” 
nonetheless? Here contemporary analytical philosophical methods that have been developed at least 
beginning with the work of Rudolf Carnap (e.g., with regards to “explication”) can have great utility 
[80,81]. 
 
2. In offering a descriptive or causal explanation, how do we move beyond providing a statistical view of 
the phenomenon at hand [82]? Given current trends in biology and the natural sciences in general 
towards the expansion of numerical models and big-data science [83], this question becomes especially 
important, as no natural process can have a “statistical nature”; a natural process just has a “nature”, 
which we may choose to model statistically in the absence of a suitable explanatory theory. In fact, some 
historians of science rightly point out the fact that “big data” is not a new notion in the sciences, as large 
collections of data have been a staple of astronomy, in the form of astronomical tables, for many 
centuries [84,85]. 
 
3. Because many biological interactions happens at infinitesimal scales where exact measurements give 
way to approximations, can “non-standard analysis” and the theory of infinitesimals (developed by 
Abraham Robinson; published in 1966) along with hyperreal numbers [86] be used instead of standard 
calculus? Can this be combined with Gödel numbering, mereology and set theory? 
 
4. In trying to establish causal relationships in gene/protein circuits, how can we use deontic logic (which 
focuses on the notion of “obligation”)? Would deontic logical approaches help with questions such as 
does something that looks like an “effect” really need a “cause”? What role could non-classical logic 
play? Here one should note that although deontic and non-classical logical systems are themselves 
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divided into various subcomponents, the applicability to philbiology would not necessarily be in the 
closed formal proofs that these systems allow, but more in the processes and connections that they can 
hint at or disprove. 
 
TPS 
The Theoretical Problems and Solutions (TPS) category comprises a group of new questions and specific sets of 
possible solutions that are proposed using philosophical approaches. Moreover, the goal may at times be to 
come up with new or improved theories. A “good” theory is an adaptable theory, one that would allow for 
incremental growth in understanding while also hinting at gaps that a new and improved theory can fill [87] and, 
in a sense, produce a leap in understanding. Furthermore, such a theory should be developed in “abstraction 
from the full complexity” [88,89] of what is being studied. TPS also includes existing questions or paradigms that 
are expanded or modified. Some examples include: 
 
1. What is the difference between two helical or beta-sheet domains of equal length in two proteins arising 
from different amino acid sequences? Is a disordered domain of a protein really “disordered”, or do such 
domains adopt a limited set of structures that are “appropriate to, but not caused by” [90] the protein/lipid 
microenvironment around the protein? Can new protein folding theories become alternatives to 
molecular dynamics simulations [91]? Is it conceivable that in some circumstances protein folding, rather 
than proceeding to minimize free energy [92], proceeds primarily to minimize search efficiency only (i.e., 
“computational” efficiency from the perspective of the amino acid sequence)? These questions are not 
only important in understanding the structure and dynamics of proteins, but are also indispensable in 
deriving new theories to account for protein aggregation in neurodegenerative diseases or prion-like 
propagation of proteins such as the tau protein [93,94]. Furthermore, these questions all have 
unresolved theoretical underpinnings that can be resolved piece by piece using philosophy. For 
example, if one tries to conceptualize the number of possible atom-to-atom “interactions” (a vague 
notion that needs resolution itself) as a nascent polypeptide chain emerges from the ribosome, the 
number of possibilities can easily escape finite bounds, whereas it is evident that protein folding takes 
place in a finite amount of time in the cell or even in artificial conditions. An infinite number of 
possibilities resolving in a finite amount of time is reminiscent of a “supertask” in mechanical philosophy 
[95], a concept that has been explored since the Antiquity. 
 
2. Given the many ambiguities about the structure of water molecules [96], how do hydrophilic residues of 
proteins really interact with water molecules in their vicinity? Are such interactions always electrostatic in 
nature, or could non-electrostatic interactions, such as hydrogen-hydrogen (H-H) bonding (which is 
distinct from electrostatic hydrogen bonding [97]), also play an important role? It should be noted that 
water is by no means the only “simple” ubiquitous molecule for which deep ambiguities remain. The C-H 
bonds of the seemingly simple methane molecule (CH4) are another case in point [98], a strand of 
investigation which could have implications for C-H bonds in amino acids. Moreover, given the essential 
interaction of many proteins with metal ions, organometallic compounds and other small molecules, do 
current theories satisfactorily account for the unique interaction of amino acids and these compounds? 
(As an example, see ref. [99] for a discussion of the challenges in understanding the structure of the 
organometallic compound ferrocene.) It should be noted that these questions are essential primary 
questions not only to understand protein folding, but also protein interactions with other proteins and 
macromolecules. Before finding suitable answers to these questions, it is doubtful that an explanatory 
framework can ever reach a point so that broader concepts, such as cross-species “inter-interactomes” 
of protein-protein interaction networks [100], could be addressed. 
 
3. What is the concept of time in the cell (cellular time as opposed to circadian time) [78]? Does a cell need 
a sub-second timekeeping or pacemaking mechanism to arrange the plethora of simultaneous functions 
taking place in the cytoplasm and other subcellular compartments? If so, what can such a mechanism 
be? 
 
4. Can one deduce whether the timeframe of a given cellular process increases polynomially with the 
increasing complexity of the task? This problem could borrow from extensive research in theoretical 
computer science under the famous P (polynomial) versus NP (nondeterministic polynomial) paradigm. 
Such questions can initially draw from existing research in computational biology regarding the protein 
folding problem [101] or RNA structure prediction [102], to name a few. One can eventually expand the 
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scope of these investigations to include kinetic studies of enzymes and process timing in the framework 
of the Michaelis-Menten equation [103]. 
 
5. What exactly is aging on an organism level, and what accounts for the diversity of aging profiles across 
species [104,105] and different phyla [106,107]? As evidenced by work on the Prochlorococcus genus 
[108], this line of investigation would require an analysis of what it really means to be a species, a 
genus, etc. [109,110]. 
 
6. For the phenomenon of antimicrobial resistance, as alluded to earlier, can one devise a strategy where 
the emergence of resistance would theoretically be impossible? Since the introduction of sulfonamide 
antibacterial drugs in the 1930s, the emergence of resistant subpopulations of bacteria or fungi has 
become inevitable [111]. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the re-emerging bacteriophage research field 
[112], strategies are beginning to be refurbished or newly devised where compound-based antimicrobial 
resistance would become avoidable [113,114,115,116,117]. This is a critical and ripe area for practical 
philosophical contributions. 
 
7. In cancer biology, what are the theoretical underpinnings of the occasionally paradoxical nature of cell 
proliferation, metastasis [118], heterogeneous origins [119], differing outcomes [120] and spontaneous 
regression [121,122,123]? How can some of these paradoxes be used as “natural experiments” 
[124,125,126] in cancer research? Since the postulation of the Warburg effect more than 90 years ago, 
our understanding of cancer metabolism, and oncology in general, has greatly advanced. Nevertheless, 
an all-encompassing theory is still lacking. For example, in reviewing a recent metabolomic analysis of 
cancer cell proliferation [127], Tanner and Rutter pose the following questions that need explanation 
[128] (quoted here with permission): 
 
“Although the majority of cell protein is comprised of amino acids imported from the environment, why do 
cultured cells—awash in amino-acid-rich culture medium—utilize glutamine to synthesize other amino 
acids de novo even when those amino acids are available for import? Might this have to do with limited 
import capacity, or is there a separate unforeseen advantage to biosynthesis? Finally, the finding that 
glucose-derived carbon contributes to a small fraction of cell mass raises still more questions. Why don’t 
proliferating cells utilize the large amounts of carbon consumed as glucose to meet their biosynthetic 
needs? What is the purpose of such a carbon-wasting metabolic program? Is it simply that this program 
enables the rapid production of adequate ATP while maintaining the NAD/NADH redox balance, or is 
there more to it?” [128] 
 
One could posit that these and other questions will only yield to new experimental studies if a new 
explanatory theory is provided to frame the plethora of pieces of knowledge that are already known in 
this field. In fact, certain areas within the cancer research field (e.g., cancer stem cells or 
immunotherapy) have already benefited noticeably from philosophical and theoretical approaches 
[129,130,131,132]. 
 
8. More broadly, what are the inherent differences between correlation and causation [133,134]? Do they 
have structural differences? For what questions might causal thinking and the notion of agency not be 
necessary? In areas such as neural networks, to paraphrase the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus of 
Ephesus, “is a hidden connection stronger than an obvious connection”? Could a hidden or 
unobservable variable in an experiment, to borrow from economic theory, “share covariance properties 
with the observed variables” [135]? (Refs. [136,137,138] provide further discussion related to this topic.) 
Additionally, similar to the notion mentioned earlier for disordered domains in proteins, are there 
biological processes that are “appropriate to but not caused by” [90] the stimuli that are currently thought 
to be the causes of those processes? These questions are fundamental to all areas of biology, from 
investigating the still-unraveling workings of organelles [139,140] to metabolic processes [141], cell-
death pathways [142], designing protocols that allow a smoother transition of findings from model 
organisms to humans [143], and human speech fluency [144], to name a few. It is also evident that a 
more thorough understanding of causative structures has direct applicability to research on the 
pathomechanism of diseases regardless of whether the exact etiology is more or less known (e.g., 
Mendelian [145,146] or infectious diseases [147]) or unknown (e.g., many chronic/complex diseases). A 
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case in point is the ongoing discussion on where the exact cause of neurotoxicity and pathology in 
Alzheimer’s disease truly resides [148,149]. 
 
9. Do cellular processes that seem chaotic, stochastic or random [150,151,152,153], such as bursts of 
transcription or Brownian-like motion of different macromolecules in the cytoplasm, in fact follow as-yet 
unrecognized deterministic pathways [154,155]? 
 
10. What exactly is uncertainty, and is it possible to postulate theories that go beyond a statistical 
description of uncertainty? For example, the American Statistical Association has recently emphasized 
that a p-value is “a statement about data in relation to a specified hypothetical explanation, and is not a 
statement about the explanation itself” [156]. In addition, are there concepts that “ought to be true” but 
that we cannot describe or observe with any certainty? Are there aspects of biological cells which one 
can never be certain about? In other words, are there limits to our understanding in certain areas of 
biology (e.g., see ref. [25])? The “low handing fruits” amongst these questions may initially be found in 
computational biology. For example, there have been efforts to identify inherent upper limits in 
accelerating search speeds in biological datasets [157]. Moreover, notions of “loose and tight” limits 
have been defined for computational problems [158]. Furthermore, similar questions can be asked in 
chemistry, as in the words of Christopher T. Walsh: “how much new chemistry is yet to be found [and] 
what kinds of biosynthetic enzymatic transformations are yet to be characterized?” [159]. 
 
11. The field of neuroscience is readily conducive to philosophical and theoretical inquiries (e.g., see refs. 
[160,161,162,163]). However, in light of the numerous unsolved, lower-hanging-fruit problems in 
“simpler” organisms such as D. melanogaster or C. elegans [164], many questions regarding human 
cognition, the primate nervous system or the mouse brain (the circuity of which is beginning to be 
mapped [165]) may remain outside the purview of philbiology for some time to come. Nevertheless, 
there are questions that could be further refined in human cognition and neuroscience using philbiology. 
For example, why are “our brains […] preprogrammed to misread certain images”? [166] or what is the 
initiating mechanism of voluntary movements [167]? 
 
12. Lastly, certain philosophy of biology threads could be investigated from a philbiological perspective with 
immediate application to both the philosophy of biology field and philosophical biology. In fact, the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that “when addressing [conceptual puzzles within biology], 
there is no clear distinction between philosophy of biology and theoretical biology”. For instance, if 
chemistry is arguably not reducible to physics (yet unifiable at the same time) [90], in the same spirit 
could we ask if the properties of a biological system (e.g., a cell) can ever be reduced to the properties 
of its components (e.g., proteins)? As another example, if one excludes some obvious explanations, why 
are certain findings either in molecular biology or clinical medicine not reproducible [168]? Approaches 
to tackle these and other questions of this kind are well-established in the philosophy of science 
literature, and therefore philbiology and philosophy of science are not exclusive of each other. 
 
 
Philbiology: Inherent and Experimental Verifiability 
Given the various lines of study suggested above in the TMT and TPS sections, what would be an endpoint to, 
or natural progression of, a philbiological investigation? Is empirical verification a necessary touchstone? 
Although certain outcomes of philbiological studies can and should be tested computationally or in a molecular 
biology laboratory, one can posit that experimental validation should not be the ultimate standard to validate or 
invalidate such an investigation. Again to draw an analogy with theoretical physics, early quantum physicists 
realized that some theoretical paradigms will, at least for the foreseeable future, remain outside the purview of 
experimental falsifiability in light of the inherent limits within physical experimental approaches [169]. The 
recently announced Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) experimental results act as a 
case in point [170]. The non-obligatory interaction between theory and experiment is not limited to physics but 
can also be observed in, for example, economics [171] or biolinguistics [172]. It is therefore to be anticipated that 
philbiology would also generate hypotheses or questions that cannot be tested in the laboratory immediately, but 
their value would only be shown in time and in perhaps not-so-predictable manners. 
 
Theories developed using philbiology are certainly not endpoints in a given theoretical investigation. 
They are merely stepping stones toward more complete frameworks and programs. A relevant example here is 
the culmination of many biological theories and empirical validation attempts that now form the exhaustive set of 
 
10 
 
transcriptional and translational programs in developmental biology [173]. This process can also be observed in 
biolinguistics, whereby linguistic theories that led to our current state of understanding of Universal Grammar 
were included in a Minimalist Program, which was then followed amongst other things by the development of the 
Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT). SMT is now a robust explanatory framework that can allow linguists to discover 
the extent to which one can “account for the relevant phenomena of language” [174]. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the modern biological disciplines to produce genuine instances of understanding of the workings of the cell, 
philosophy must regain its rightful place in the theoretical foundations of biology. This is in line with the 
development of the natural sciences at least since the Enlightenment. The overarching aim of philbiology could 
be to define suitably innovative and worthwhile horizons for individual parts of biomedical research, horizons that 
are not mere pedantic extrapolations of current technical information. Furthermore, solutions that arise from 
these investigations may be isomorphic, such that their theoretical structure could be applicable to other areas of 
the sciences, in the same line that a number of frameworks from modern linguistics have been applied in this 
manuscript in the context of philosophical biology. 
 
 It may be apt to end on a note that the complexities and “deep truths” of cellular processes could remain 
hidden even in spite of philbiology and other sincere efforts. In other words, “the sea will be the sea, whatever 
the drop’s philosophy” (Attar of Nishapur). Nevertheless, one can at least be assured that a philosophical 
approach to biology will constantly question our questions and provide a framework for reassessing and 
improving our perspectives of the workings of the cell in normal and disease biology. 
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FIGURE LEGEND 
 
Figure 1. A proposed outline for philosophical biology investigations. Philbiology can be framed as a set of 
perspectives to approach what is known and not known about a given topic in biology. These perspectives could 
be cognisant of (1) analytical, cognitive and rational philosophical reasoning, (2) a general goal toward 
simplification and parsimony, (3) novel mathematical, logical or other means of measurement, and (4) a general 
aura of uncertainty around the interface between our cognitive capacity and different hard facets of nature. An 
investigation that bears philbiology into account can (A) use these perspectives and choose one or more 
philosophical tools to (B) approach the problem at hand, using those tools to refine, redefine or even dismiss the 
initial question. If the question is not dismissed, (C) a set of possible solutions could be proposed. The set of 
possible solutions could eventually be amalgamated into a new theory, which (D) may or may not be verifiable 
based on the current experimental paradigms of the period. (E) This process is repeated as more is observed or 
realized about the said topic. Cell illustration adapted from ref. [78]. 
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